Suppressing Foreign Influence:

The Impact of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law on North Korean Society

October, 2024

DAILY NK

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1 Research Background and Objectives

In December 2020, North Korea introduced the "Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law," also known as the "Anti-Reactionary Thought Law."[1] This legislation imposes harsh penalties on North Koreans who import or consume foreign cultural content. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, the government continued to prioritize ideological control, passing additional restrictive laws such as the Youth Education Guarantee Law[2] in 2021 and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law in 2023.

Critics argue that instead of focusing on protecting citizens' basic rights and ensuring their survival during the pandemic, the North Korean government has used this period to further limit personal freedoms. The international community has expressed particular concern over the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law, as both allow the death penalty as punishment for violators. This extreme measure has raised alarm about the threat to North Koreans' right to life.[3]

The international community faces significant challenges in understanding the current situation within North Korea. Since Kim Jong-un's rise to power, state policies have undergone substantial reorganization, leading to notable changes in the daily lives of North Korean citizens. These changes are expected to continue.

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1 The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law was enacted on December 4, 2020, and revised on August 19, 2022

2 Considering that North Korean youth tend to show significant differences from the older generation who entrusted their survival and life paths to the state, it can be inferred that there was an internal need to strengthen powerful control, especially centered on the younger generation who are perfunctory in their obedience. Cho Jung-ah et al., "Youth in North Korea in the Kim Jong-un Era: Between Conformity and Self-Reliance, Traversing State and Market," (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2023), p. 7.

3 Jang Seul-gi, Daily NK, "High-ranking official's daughter publicly executed for watching and distributing South Korean entertainment shows like "Rich People in the Neighborhood' and 'Alley Restaurant,'" February 25, 2022, https://www.dailynk.com/20220225-4/.

Given the strict censorship and state control in North Korea, it's crucial to examine the hardships and crises faced by its residents from a human rights perspective. While various entities—including the South Korean government, NGOs, and international organizations—conduct surveys on North Korea, these efforts often lack continuity and fail to provide comprehensive data. As a result, the analysis of North Korean society has struggled to keep pace with the country's rapid social changes. This report acknowledges the limitations of available data while emphasizing their value in complementing existing information. By combining various sources, we can work towards a more complete understanding of the evolving situation in North Korea, despite the challenges in obtaining reliable information.

Given these circumstances, it's crucial to investigate how deeply the North Korean government's efforts to control language, thought, and exposure to foreign culture penetrate citizens' daily lives. Specifically, we need to understand how the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law is being implemented and enforced among the population. Internal surveys within North Korea are particularly valuable in this context, as they can provide insight into the current reality and help track future trends.

This study aims to examine the actual conditions of crackdowns and punishments under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law as experienced by North Koreans. By analyzing these findings, we hope to:

1. Provide a detailed analysis of the crises faced by North Korean citizens
2. Inform the international community about these realities
3. Create a platform for discussing appropriate international responses to these issues

By focusing on real-world implementation and effects of this law, we can gain a more accurate understanding of the challenges facing North Korean citizens and work towards developing effective strategies to address these human rights concerns.

2 Survey Methodology and Significance

This survey of North Koreans was conducted to examine how the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law is being implemented within North Korea and to understand the perceptions of North Korean citizens regarding this law.

The survey targeted respondents evenly distributed across all regions of North Korea, focusing on those currently living within the country to closely examine the actual internal situation. An insider approach was used to guide the investigation. The study included a total of 100 participants from various parts of North Korea. The survey employed a snowball sampling method, starting with a small group of key informants who then introduced other respondents.

To supplement the quantitative results, in-depth interviews were conducted with five officials responsible for enforcing the law or controlling citizens. The survey design involved two rounds of external consultation on the initial questionnaire, and the draft research report was reviewed by two experts whose feedback was incorporated into the final version.

[Figure 1] Gender Distribution of Survey Participants (100 people)



Of the total 100 participants in this survey, 47% (47 people) were male and 53% (53 people) were female. Considering that surveys on conditions in North Korea that target North Korean defectors typically have a higher proportion of women, this survey is significant in that it avoids gender bias.

The 100 participants were evenly distributed across all age groups: 23% in their 20s, 28% in their 30s, 28% in their 40s, 18% in their 50s and 3% in their 60s. It is noteworthy that the responses from those in their 20s and 30s, who are subject to the strict application of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, account for more than 50% of the total. This suggests that the survey adequately captures the reality of how the law is enforced in North Korea.

The survey respondents were distributed according to population density across different regions, with priority given to residents of provincial capital cities. The study divided North Korea into four areas to examine regional characteristics: Inter-Korean Border (South Hwanghae Province, Kangwon Province); China-DPRK Border (North Pyongan Province, Jagang Province, Ryanggang Province, North Hamgyong Province); Pyongyang; and Central Region (North Hwanghae Province, South Pyongan Province, South Hamgyong Province).

[Figure 2] Age Distribution of Survey Participants (100 people)



[Figure 3] Geographical Distribution of Survey Participants (100 people)



To gain insight into the perspectives of those enforcing the law, in-depth interviews were conducted with five individuals currently working in law enforcement and party organizations. For security reasons, the personal information of these officials is not disclosed.

3 What is the DPRK Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law?

The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, enacted in North Korea in December 2020, aims to comprehensively block foreign cultural influences. This legislation targets various channels of external content, including television, radio, digital media, books, and mobile phones. It goes further by considering the imitation of South Korean speech or dress as reactionary acts and even placing responsibility on parents for their children's ideological education at home. Unlike standard criminal laws, North Korea has implemented special laws for social control, including this one, the Drug-Related Crimes Prevention Law, and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law. These laws contain provisions for both administrative and criminal punishments, with some violations potentially carrying the death penalty.

Before the enactment of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, regulations related to external information control were limited to only three articles in the Criminal Law: Article 183 (Crime of Importing and Distributing Decadent Culture), Article 184 (Crime of Engaging in Decadent Acts), and Article 185 (Crime of Listening to Hostile Broadcasts, Collecting, Storing, and Distributing Enemy Publications). The maximum punishment was correctional labor. However, the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law includes 14 punishment clauses from Article 27 to Article 40 under Chapter 4: Legal Responsibility for Violations of the Order to Reject Reactionary Ideology and Culture. The punishment provisions have been subdivided into eight categories and strengthened to allow for imposing up to the death penalty.

[Table 1] Reasons for Punishment Under the Anti-Reactionary Thought Law and Punishments

	Reasons for Punishment	Punishment
Criminal Punishments	Crime of Spreading Puppet Ideology and Culture (Article 27)	Maximum Life Imprisonment with Labor
	Crime of Spreading Hostile State Ideology and Culture (Article 28)	Maximum Death Penalty
	Crime of Spreading Pornography, Obscenity, and Superstition (Article 29)	Maximum Death Penalty
	Crime of Spreading Foreign Ideology and Culture (Article 30)	Maximum 10 Years of Correctional Labor
	Crime of Spreading Impure Culture (Article 31)	Maximum 3 to 5 Years of Correctional Labor
	Crime of Reenacting Puppet Culture (Article 32)	Maximum 2 Years of Correctional Labor
	Crime of Violating Electronic and Radio Equipment Usage Order (Article 33)	Maximum 5 Years of Correctional Labor
	Crime of Non-reporting (Article 34)	Short-Term Labor
	Citizens Who Committed Illegal Acts (Article 35)	Fine
	Institutions, Enterprises, and Organizations That Committed Illegal Acts (Article 38)	Fine
	Money and Items Used in Crimes and Illegal Acts (Article 40)	Confiscation
Administrative Punishments	Citizens Who Committed Illegal Acts (Article 35)	Labor Reeducation
	Officials Who Committed Illegal Acts (Article 36)	Unpaid Labor, Demotion, Dismissal, Expulsion
	Severe Actions of Institutions, Enterprises, and Organizations That Committed Illegal Acts (Article 39)	Suspension or Closure

In other words, the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law defines as illegal all general acts of North Koreans freely accessing, collecting, utilizing, or exchanging external information and specifies punishments ranging from fines to the death penalty for these acts.

This law can be seen as strongly violating not only Article 6 (right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but also Article 18 (right to freedom of thought and conscience) and Article 19 (freedom of expression).

While the death penalty is not prohibited under international human rights law, Article

6, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR states that in countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may only be imposed for the "most serious crimes" in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. The UN Human Rights Committee recommends that "most serious crimes" should be interpreted restrictively, and in various country reports, it has pointed out that imposing the death penalty for crimes such as treason and political crimes, which are not "most serious crimes," violates Article 6 of the ICCPR.[4]

Based on this interpretation, Article 29 of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, which deals with the crimes of spreading pornography, obscenity and superstition, does not fall under the category of "most serious crimes." Even if Article 28, which covers the crime of spreading the ideology and culture of hostile countries, is considered treason under North Korean law, it still violates Article 6 of the ICCPR on the right to life (especially Paragraph 2, which states that the death penalty should be imposed only for the most serious crimes).

Moreover, as stated in Articles 1-3, punishments under this special law, which is aimed at protecting North Korea's socialist ideology against attempts to collapse the North Korean system, put people at risk of abstract or overly broad application, leading to ambiguity (risk of arbitrary punishment). Considering these points, there is a high possibility that actual enforcement may violate ICCPR Article 9 on liberty and security of person (especially Paragraphs 2-5, which provide procedural safeguards for liberty and security of individuals).

4 Lee Woo-tae et al., "White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2023" (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2023), pp. 54-55.

4 The Current State of Education on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law

First, this survey examined the extent to which North Koreans have been educated about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law. Since the establishment of the regime, North Korea has prioritized ideological education by the party organization over the law in controlling and managing the state and society. In North Korea, the enactment of laws and the issuance of directives are accompanied by ideological education and training. Given the reality that North Korean citizens have limited access to the law, understanding how they have been educated by their affiliated organizations provides an opportunity to examine the intentions of legislation and state control.

1) Education on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law

In response to the question about whether they had been educated on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, 95% of respondents said they had, while 5% said they had not. This indicates that most North Koreans have heard about the law. There were no significant differences observed across gender or age groups.

[Table 2] Education on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, by Gender (100 people)

	Male	Female	Percentage
Received	45	50	95%
Haven't received	2	3	5%
Total	47	53	100%

Regionally, the awareness of the law was slightly lower in inland border areas (87.5% in inland border areas, 92.3% in central inland areas) compared to the North Korea-China border regions (100%) and Pyongyang (100%). This indicates that one of the main objectives of enacting and promulgating the law was to control the North Korea-

China border regions, where the enjoyment of foreign culture is quite high, and the capital city of Pyongyang.

[Table 3] Education on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, by Area (100 people)

	Inter-Korean Border	Percent-age	China-DPRK Border	Percent-age	Pyong-yang	Percent-age	Central Region	Percent-age
Recei-ved	14	87.5%	31	100%	14	100%	36	92.3%
Haven't received	2	12.5%	0	0%	0	0%	3	7.7%
Total	16	100%	31	100%	14	100%	39	100%

To understand if North Koreans perceive any changes in practice, we asked whether the law enforcement practices had changed before and after the enactment of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law. In response to this question, 81% of the 100 respondents said that there had been changes in practices, indicating they were aware of changes, while 18% said that there is no change in practices. One percent (1 person) responded that they were not sure.

[Figure 4] Whether Respondents Were Aware of Changes in Practices under the Law, by Age (100 people)



There were slight differences in responses to the same question across age groups. Notably, 95.7% of respondents in their 20s, who are the main targets of crackdowns,

said that the law enforcement practices had changed. Among those in their 30s, who are presumed to have long-term experience watching South Korean dramas, 67.9% said it had changed. (See Figure 4)

Interestingly, 82.1% of respondents in their 40s acknowledged the difference in the law, a significantly higher percentage than the 67.9% of those in their 30s. This difference could have been driven by article 26 and 37 of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law.

The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law includes legal enforcement and punishment provisions even for the rearing of children.
Article 26: Parents must strengthen family education and control to prevent their children from viewing or distributing impure publications and propaganda materials.
Article 37: The following fines shall be imposed on citizens who violate the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law... (omitted)

4. A fine of 100,000 to 200,000 won shall be imposed in cases where anti-reactionary thought crimes occur due to irresponsible education and upbringing of children.

This suggests that during education on law it is likely emphasized the strengthened control over youth and the explicit mention of parental joint responsibility in the law. Because of this unlike those in their 30s, those in their 40s with teenage children[5] may be experiencing more intense control over their actions in practice.

Regarding specific actions being cracked down on, 72% of all respondents said they had changed, while 26% said they remained the same. The age group ratios were similar to those for law enforcement practice. (See Figure 5)

5 Daily NK reported recently that a mother even reported the authorities about her daughter, who was deeply immersed in South Korean dramas. Eun-seol, Daily NK, "Mother reports daughter for watching S. Korean media, shocking N. Korean workers," August 4, 2024, https://www.dailynk.com/english/snapshots-north-korea-july-29-august-2-2024/.

[Figure 5] Awareness of Changes in Scope for Anti-Reactionary Thought Crackdowns



2) Methods and Content of Education

Through questions about how respondents had learned about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, we found that education on the law was conducted comprehensively and systematically through local organizational units to which most North Koreans belong.[6] For example, education on the law was conducted through meetings, study sessions, and lectures held at *inminban* (neighborhood watch units), youth leagues, and workplaces.

In North Korea, there is an established system of organizational life, including regular weekly lectures and study sessions for all residents. These lectures and studies not only indoctrinate ideology but also convey the party and state positions on recent issues.

The individuals conducting education related to the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law were mostly figures in the respective party organization[7] cell

6 It appears that the North Korean-style socialist rule of law is currently in the process of formation. Hwang Ui-jeong, "The Meaning and Limitations of North Korean-style Socialist Rule of Law in the Kim Jong-un Era," January 2019, "*Northeast Asian Legal Studies*" Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 109.

secretaries, inminban leaders[8] or those in charge of public surveillance. On April 6, 2021, at the 6th Congress of Cell Secretaries of the Workers' Party of Korea, Jo Yong-won, the party's organizational secretary, emphasized in his report that "party cells should become the starting point for sweeping away anti-socialism and non-socialism, waging a fierce struggle and creating a strong wind to establish moral discipline."[9]

The main content of the lectures, according to respondents, focused on "why the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law was enacted" (2024-HA-8, 2024-HA-12), explaining its necessity, and emphasizing that "violating this law will result in severe punishment" (2024-PY-3, 2024-SI-6, 2024-J-4, 2024-J-6). This suggests that the primary purpose of these lectures was not so much to provide information about the law or to educate the public, but rather to instill fear among North Koreans.

Particularly regarding punishment, a strong resolve was evident in the explanatory materials on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law obtained by Daily NK in 2021. It was confirmed that after the law's enactment (December 2020), North Korean authorities extracted content from Articles 27 to 38, which specifically outline punishments, and used it as lecture material for residents.[10] By providing sentencing guidelines through these lectures, they are maximizing fear.

According to respondents, the lecture content on controlling external recordings has clearly changed since before the law was passed. Examining the responses, the emphasis on "content regarding parents' education of their children" (2024-S-3, 2024-PY-10, 2024-SI-1) stands out.

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7 The 2nd Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Committees, held in Pyongyang on February 28, 2022, was convened five years and two months into Kim Jong-un's rule. It emphasized strengthening ideological education for cadres, party members, and residents. Bae Young-kyung, *Yonhap News*, "Kim Jong-un Emphasizes 'Devotion to the People' to Local Party Cadres... 'Even if it means carving into bone and flesh' (Comprehensive)," April 1, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220301013151504

8 The *inminban* (people's unit) is the smallest administrative unit in North Korea, and one of the roles of the inminban leader is to monitor the members of their unit and report their activities to the relevant authorities. Hyun Hye-ran, Yonhap News, "North Korea Enacts Law to Favor Inminban Leaders, the 'End of the Surveillance System'... Aimed at Strengthening Control over Residents," April 8, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240408015500504.

9 Kim Dong-ha, *Chosun Ilbo*, "North Korea Opens Cell Secretary Conference... Kim Jong-un Attends," April 7, 2021, https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2021/04/07/2J5YWYE7T5AS5IBNKSM3BIQALM/ .

10 Jang Seul-gi, *Daily NK*, "Exclusive: Daily NK obtains materials explaining specifics of new 'anti-reactionary thought' law," January 18, 2021, https://www.dailynk.com/english/exclusive-daily-nk-obtains-materials-explaining-specifics-new-anti-reactionary-thought-law.

Additionally, because there was a strong trend among youth in their 20s to watch external media such as Korean dramas and movies,[11] the content emphasized the principle of guilt by association, stating that families could be punished together, in order to control the youth.

Respondents also said that members of the local security department or the standing organization commonly referred to as Unified Command 82[12] visited to deliver lectures. Unified Command 82 is a non-permanent organization that strengthened the status of the existing Anti-Socialist and Non-Socialist Joint Command, following the decision of the Third Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers' Party in June 2021.[13] Whether the lectures are delivered by the security department and the Unified Command 82 varies by region, with security officers directly delivering lectures in areas depending on the degree of external cultural influx.

Thus, it can be confirmed that the North Korean authorities have established a legal framework for punishment through legislation and strengthened ideological education and control from the lowest units to the central party organization.

3) Education About the Law for Officials

The introduction of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law can be seen as a move to systematize control measures over North Korean citizens. By enacting this legislation, the government appears to have given officials more specific guidelines and authority for controlling the population.

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11 In particular, these individuals have continuously become subjects of state concerns by acquiring information technology skills through education that advocates for 'making all people into scientific and technological talents' and the development of an information environment. Jo Jeong-a et al., op. cit., p. 8.

12 Looking at part of the Central Committee directive obtained by Daily NK, Article 2 specifies that the Unified Command 82 should thoroughly establish a unified command system in the fight against anti-socialism and non-socialism. Kim Chae-hwan, *Daily NK*, "North Korea renames organization tasked with cracking down on 'non-socialist behavior,' November 9, 2021, https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-renames-organization-tasked-cracking-down-non-socialist-behavior/.

13 "North Korea Legislates Ideological Control on "MZ Generation Anti-Socialism'... Mandates Even Home Education," Bae Young-kyung, *Yonhap News*, February 5, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220203098800504.

To understand how this law is being implemented, we examined the training provided to officials about it. In our in-depth interviews with legal and party organization officials, we asked about their education on this law. Their responses revealed that training primarily focused on justifying the law's existence.

Officials were taught that the law's purpose is to "defend the North Korean regime," and they reported receiving directives to "thoroughly control and monitor residents" to this end. (2024-In-depth-3)

This point contradicts Article 8 of the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which stipulates that "The social system of the DPRK is a people-centered system under which the working people are the masters of everything and everything in society serves the working people. The State shall defend the interests of the workers, peasants, soldiers, working intellectuals and all other working people who have been freed from exploitation and oppression and become the masters of the State and society, and respect and protect human rights."

Legal institutions operate within a framework where laws are enacted, policies are established, and education follows. Employees of these institutions reported receiving training on the practical implementation of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law. This training covered topics such as methods for identifying violators. They also mentioned receiving directives to intensify enforcement efforts, with a particular focus on adolescents and young adults. (2024-In-depth-5)

Additionally, North Korea has submitted human rights reports and participated in reviews three times in November 2009, April 2014, and May 2019, accepting meaningful recommendations in the field of criminal justice, including the need for education of judicial professionals in line with international standards.[14]

A key takeaway from the officials' responses is that the law's purpose is not to safeguard residents' rights. Instead, it's evident that officials were granted significant power to control the population without clear guidelines on proper enforcement procedures.

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14 Korean Bar Association, "2022 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea," p. 28.

5 The Current State of Enforcement and Punishment under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law

The survey results reveal a significant impact of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law on North Korean citizens since its enactment in December 2020. Out of all respondents, 38 reported personal experiences of being targeted under this law. This rate of direct encounters with enforcement was consistent across different age groups, genders, and regions, suggesting widespread implementation of the law. (Figure 6)

[Figure 6] Levels of Experience with Crackdowns and Witnessing Crackdowns



1) Witnessed Cases of Crackdowns

A total of 93 respondents (93%) reported having **witnessed** crackdowns, while 7 respondents (7%) did not respond. Among the 93 witnesses, most reported observing between one and five incidents. Notably, eight respondents reported witnessing more than 10 incidents. (Figure 7)

[Figure 7] Number of Witnessed Cases of Crackdowns by Region



Out of the 93 witnesses, 83 reported having witnessed crackdowns in 2023 and 2024 as well. The intensity of these crackdowns appears to have significantly increased compared to 2021 and 2022 (See Figure 8). In other words, this reconfirms that the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law has been intensively enforced in the past two years, following the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. This trend appears to be consistent across all regions.

[Figure 8] Frequency of Crackdowns by Region and Time Period (Multiple Responses Allowed)



Out of the 38 individuals who have personally experienced crackdowns, 30 were subjected to crackdowns in 2023 and 2024 (see Figure 9). In 2024, a higher rate of people experiencing arrests (see Table 5) was observed among those in their 20s (see Table 4) and in the central and border regions.

[Figure 9] Percentage of Crackdowns by Year



[Table 4] Crackdowns by Year and Age (Direct Experience)

	20s	%	30s	%	40s	%	50s	%
2024	7	77.8%	3	27.3%	3	37.5%	5	50.0%
2023	1	11.1%	6	54.5%	2	25.0%	3	30.0%
2022	0	0.0%	1	9.1%	2	25.0%	1	10.0%
Before 2021	1	11.1%	1	9.1%	1	12.5%	1	10.0%
Total	9	100%	11	100%	8	100%	10	100%

[Table 5] Crackdowns by Year and Geographical Area (Direct Experience)

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyong-yang	%	Central Region	%
2024	2	33.3%	5	50.0%	0	0.0%	11	64.7%
2023	2	33.3%	3	30.0%	4	80.0%	3	17.6%
2022	2	33.3%	1	10.0%	0	0.0%	1	5.9%
Before 2021	0	0.0%	1	10.0%	1	20.0%	2	11.8%
Total	6	99.9%	10	100%	5	100%	17	100%

2) Agencies Conducting Crackdowns and Current Situation

Based on these individuals' experiences with crackdowns, specific questions were asked about the agencies conducting the crackdowns, locations, and details about the crackdowns, arrests, and investigations. The most notable characteristic was that most crackdowns were conducted by task forces called "gruppa" (76.9%), and in some cases, by youth leagues. Specific responses about the crackdown situations show that they were mostly carried out by gruppas or permanent organizations consisting of two to three people, with some gruppas having up to eight members (see Figure 10).[15]

These characteristics confirm that in North Korea, arbitrary crackdowns by organizations without legal basis are possible. This is also evident in the in-depth interview responses from legal and party organization officials. When asked if they had ever conducted a crackdown, even respondents not working in legal institutions said they had participated in crackdowns.

[Figure 10] Types of Agencies Conducting Crackdowns



15 According to a 2021 Daily NK report, the secret inspection team of the Korean Socialist Women's Union (Women's Union), organized around July 2021, was tasked with secretly monitoring and reporting all statements and actions of residents. It was revealed that they monitored residents' phone conversations on the streets, as well as young people's hairstyles, songs, dances, and every move. Jung Seo-young, Daily NK, "Women's Union 'Secret Inspection Team' Organized to Eradicate Anti-socialism and Non-socialism," July 22, 2021, https://www.dailynk.com/.

During the in-depth interviews, officials provided eight cases in which they participated in crackdowns. Typically, they became involved in crackdowns through surprise inspections or arrests based on reports from people around them. Rather than conducting crackdowns alone, they usually formed anti-socialist, non-socialist gruppas with two to six members working together. There was one case of a single person conducting a crackdown, but this was within a military unit.

Looking at the responses of 93 witnesses, while the targets of crackdowns varied, it appears that young people such as students, soldiers, and youth league members from various occupations, as well as women in their 40s and 50s engaged in business, were subject to severe crackdowns. The in-depth interviews of officials also showed that the targets of crackdowns were young employees working in factories or businesses, people in their 20s, soldiers, and high school students. Recently, there seems to have been an increasing focus on younger age groups.[16]

While gruppas often conduct crackdowns on external media even before the enactment of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, a recent trend is that the locations of crackdowns are arbitrary places such as homes and streets. Of the 38 people who were victims of crackdowns, the main locations were streets (26.3%) and surprise home searches (44.7%) (see Table 6).[17]

[Table 6] Distribution of Locations of Crackdowns (Direct Experience)

	No. of Respondents	%
Streets	10	26.3%
Houses	17	44.7%
Workplaces	2	5.3%
Other Places	8	21.1%
No Response	1	2.6%
Total	38	100%

16 The intensified crackdowns on younger generations may be related not only to the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law but also to the Youth Education Guarantee Law enacted on September 29, 2021, though this requires more in-depth investigation.

17 Article 79 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates that "Citizens are guaranteed inviolability of the person and the home and privacy of correspondence. No citizens can be placed under control or be arrested nor can their homes be searched without a legal warrant." This establishes the freedom of person and residence. Korean Bar Association, "2022 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea," p. 61.

Witnesses also reported that the most common place for crackdowns was homes at 43.3%,[18] followed by streets at 13.5%, and other public places such as marketplaces at 32.7%. This pattern showed little regional variation.

Looking at the descriptions of the circumstances during crackdowns, many of the reasons were subjective and vague, such as being stopped on the street for wearing foreign-style clothes (2024-PY-6), having blond hair (2024-PY-6), or speaking in a South Korean accent (2024-HA-13). There were also instances of being caught while walking down the street and talking with a friend about having listened to South Korean songs (2024-C-7). These situations suggest that the gruppas or enforcement officers have deeply infiltrated the daily lives of residents, literally monitoring their every move. Additionally, it was observed that random inspections have become widespread, such as suddenly checking mobile phones while walking on the street, or enforcement officers abruptly entering homes without notice while residents were briefly watching South Korean dramas during their free time.[19]

3) Arrest Status After Crackdowns

Out of the 38 people who were victims of crackdowns, 13 were arrested, confirming that about one-third of those who experienced crackdowns were arrested. While 27.8% of men who were cracked down on were arrested, 40.0% of women were arrested, showing a higher proportion of women among those arrested. This suggests that women may be experiencing more harm from crackdowns.

North Korean authorities appear intent to crack down on North Korean women. This is because North Korean women engaged in business and distribution are considered

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18 The authority given to temporary organizations to invade everyday, intimate personal spaces frequently threatens the private spaces of North Korean residents. Around 2016, Kim Jong-un reportedly instructed the Ministry of Social Security not to conduct house searches without a warrant. However, Daily NK reported that the Unified Command 82, which was elevated after the COVID crisis, has been re-authorized to conduct house inspections in pairs. Kim Chae-hwan, "Kim Jong-un instructs security officers 'Do not conduct house searches without a warrant,'" December 21, 2016, *Daily NK*.

19 To avoid these street inspections, recent media surveys have shown a tendency, especially among young people, to prefer small storage devices and devise their own coping methods. A male student in his 20s was quoted as saying, "If it's urgent on the street, you know those small cards? SD cards. I just swallow them right away." From seminar materials distributed by the Unification Media Group on October 8, 2024.

high-risk targets for committing crimes related to using foreign-made cell phones or leaking and importing internal and external information. The leakage and import of internal and external information are also defined as anti-socialist and non-socialist criminal acts.[20]

A notable point is that a significant proportion of cases were resolved by giving bribes, with 44.4% for men and 30.0% for women (see Figure 7). According to Article 6 of the North Korean People's Safety Enforcement Law, the state stipulates that human rights should not be violated or authority abused in maintaining public security.

[Table 7] Incidence of Arrests After Crackdowns

	Male	%	Female	%
Arrested	5	27.8%	8	40.0%
Not Arrested	5	27.8%	6	30.0%
Case Settled with Bribe	8	44.4%	6	30.0%
Total	18	100%	20	100%

When examined by age group, those in their 20s and 50s showed high arrest rates, at 44.5% and 40%, respectively. For those in their 30s, it's notable that a substantial 54.5% resolved the situation by giving bribes. The arrest rate for people in their 30s (18.2%) is significantly lower than that of those in their 20s (44.5%), who are the main targets of crackdowns.

[Table 8] Incidence of Arrests After Crackdowns, by Age

	20s	%	30s	%	40s	%	50s	%
Arrested	4	44.5%	2	18.2%	3	37.5%	4	40.0%
Not Arrested	3	33.3%	3	27.3%	3	37.5%	2	20.0%
Case Settled with Bribe	2	22.2%	6	54.5%	2	25.0%	4	40.0%
Total	9	100%	11	100%	8	100%	10	100%

Among cases witnessed by respondents, 60 out of 98 cases resulted in arrests.

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20 Lee Chae-eun, "Lecture on 'Strengthening the Fight Against Female Crime' Held… Residents' Reaction "Cold,'" January 11, 2024, *Daily NK*, https://www.dailynk.com/20240111-2/.

Regionally, Pyongyang was the only area where there were more cases of non-arrests than arrests during crackdowns. This can be seen as a result of a higher tendency in Pyongyang to resolve issues on the spot through bribes and other means, as many high-ranking officials and core class members live there as part of a larger wealthy population.

[Table 9] Incidence of Arrests After Crackdowns, by Geographical Area

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyong yang	%	Central Region	%
Arrested	10	62.5%	22	59.5%	4	30.8%	24	75.0%
Not Arrested	5	31.2%	15	40.5%	8	61.5%	6	18.8%
Case Settled with Bribe	1	6.3%	0	0.0%	1	7.7%	2	6.2%
Total	16	100%	37	100%	13	100%	32	100%

A limitation of this survey is that it doesn't distinguish whether "arrest" refers to initial questioning after being caught in the act, or "detention" for further investigation and preliminary examination. However, subsequent responses indicate that investigation facilities include the security department, investigator's office, and cases of transfer to the police department after crackdowns by task forces. Some respondents reported investigation periods of up to one year, raising the need to examine the legality of procedures.

(1) Implementation of Legal Procedures – Notification of Arrest Reasons and Rights

Chapter 3 of North Korea's Public Safety Enforcement Law stipulates the methods and procedures for maintaining public security.[21] Articles 42 and 43 are as follows. Article 47 limits 'detention' to cases where there's a risk of escape or unidentified individuals.

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21 However, this law applies to those who have not reached the level of criminal responsibility (Article 7), so the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, which specifies severe legal punishments, seems to be applicable depending on the case. Nevertheless, given that this law clearly contains clauses restricting freedoms and rights, and considering that North Korea often doesn't follow proper legal procedures for those accused of anti-national or anti-state crimes, adherence to proper legal procedures at the arrest stage is crucial.

Article 42: When detaining a person who has violated the legal order, a police officer must identify themselves, explain the reason for detention, and verify the person's identity and may examine objects and documents deemed relevant to the violation or investigate necessary details.

Article 43: If the identity or details of the violation are not clearly confirmed, the police officer may request the detained person and witnesses to accompany them to another location, a police station, or their office. The detained person and witnesses must comply and truthfully answer questions related to the violation.

Article 47: A police officer may detain those who flee after violating the legal order, conspire to violate it, or obstruct investigation, as well as vagrants or unidentified individuals.

According to North Korea's Criminal Procedure Law, arrest and detention are carried out after deciding on "criminal prosecution responsibility" (Article 174). Arrest and detention cannot be made without legal provisions or without following legally prescribed procedures (Article 173). The procedures for arrest and detention are as follows:

Article 178 (Procedures for Arrest and Detention): When arresting and detaining a criminal, present them with an identity verification document and arrest warrant and send a copy of the detention decision to the detention facility. When detaining a detained criminal suspect, present them with a detention decision approved by a prosecutor and send a copy to the detention facility.

Of the 13 people who experienced arrest, nine said they were given an explanation about the arrest (see Figure 11), but all respondents said they did not receive any documents regarding the arrest or search.

[Figure 11] Was An Explanation Given After Arrest?



Of the 60 respondents who witnessed arrest cases, 46 reported that an explanation for the arrest was provided. There were 14 cases where no explanation was given. Specific responses indicate that even when explanations were provided, they mostly focused on the charges for arrest, without explaining the rights of those being detained.

Regarding documentation for arrest or search, only 6 respondents reported being shown documents, while in 44 cases, no documents were presented. There were 10 non-responses. There were no significant regional differences in explanations or documentation provided for arrests.[22]

In the survey of officials, all responded that they did not show related documents to those being detained or arrested. Some stated that arrest warrants were unnecessary for arrests made in the act. This situation, where on-the-spot arrests are intensified and temporary organizations are given frequent and indiscriminate authority for crackdowns, suggests that minimum legal procedural requirements like “arrest warrants” and “search warrants” can be easily ignored.[23]

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22 A 2020 Korean Bar Association survey also found that out of 34 respondents who had experienced investigations, 23 were not given explanations for their arrest or detention reasons. Only three were presented with documents justifying their arrest or detention (such as prosecutor’s approval). Korean Bar Association, “2020 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights,” p. 60.

23 In most countries, to broadly guarantee citizens’ physical freedom and prevent arbitrary arrests and detentions by public authorities, arrests and detentions are carried out with warrants issued by judicial authorities. However,

An official from the Ministry of State Security responded that they first secure a list of people at the scene, retrieve memory devices, then arrest only the most responsible person while instructing others to come to the MSS the next day. Notably, the fact that the MSS has the authority to enforce the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law suggests that legal procedures may be completely disregarded if elements of anti-national or anti-state crimes are involved.

(2) Compliance with Legal Procedures – Notification of Arrest

North Korea's Public Safety Enforcement Law stipulates that family members should be notified of detention:

Article 49: When a person who has violated the law is detained, the prosecutor must be notified within 24 hours. The family of the detained person and their workplace or local administrative office should also be notified.

The Criminal Procedure Law also requires notification of family or acquaintances when an arrest or detention decision is made (Criminal Procedure Law Article 179). Considering the possibility of intensive questioning in the subsequent preliminary examination process, it is crucial to have opportunities for visitation or to receive assistance for legal remedies.

Article 179 (Notification of Arrest and Detention): When an arrest or detention decision is made, the suspect shall be informed, and within 48 hours of the arrest or detention, the reason for arrest or detention and the place of detention shall be provided to their family, affiliated organization, and relevant social security agency.

Regarding the question of whether family members were notified of their arrest, eight respondents said they were notified, while only one said their family found out by giving bribes. Others responded that their families knew because they were arrested at home, so notification wasn't necessary. Looking at cases where people directly

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in North Korea, all arrests and detentions needed for investigations are carried out with the self-approval of the prosecutor, who is part of the investigating authority.

experienced crackdowns, many were arrested at home, so families naturally became aware, leading many respondents to answer that notification was given.

For witnesses, in 41 out of 60 cases, the families of those arrested were notified of the arrest, with others explaining that families naturally knew due to arrests occurring at home. Regionally, Pyongyang showed a significantly higher rate of notification compared to other areas, with zero responses indicating no notification.

[Figure 12] Regional Variations in Family Notification



[Figure 13] Variations in Notifications of Arrests



When asked where they were interrogated after arrest (see Figure 14), respondents primarily said they were questioned at the office of the unit which led the crackdowns. Therefore, there were responses indicating interrogations took place in the offices of anti-socialist and non-socialist task forces or in youth league offices. (2024-S-9).[24]

[Figure 14] Agencies Conducting Investigations After Arrests (Direct Experience/Multiple Responses Allowed)



Looking at the 60 witnessed arrest cases, the most common investigative agency was the anti-socialist and non-socialist task forces with 18 cases, followed by the county (district) Ministry of Social Security with 14 cases, and local Ministry of State Security offices with 12 cases. While there were no significant regional differences, the

24 Article 55 of the People's Safety Enforcement Law: When a person who has violated the law is detained, they may be transferred to the people's security agency with jurisdiction over their residence or workplace or be subject to educational processing. In this case, relevant records and evidence are transferred together. Military personnel who detain someone transfer them to the relevant agency along with the records.

county (district) Ministry of Social Security office was most prevalent in inland border areas and Pyongyang, while anti-socialist and non-socialist task force offices were most common in North Korea-China border areas and central inland regions. Other locations included prosecutors' offices and military security departments.

In the responses from current employees to the question about where those targeted for crackdowns were interrogated (see Figure 15), most answered that the investigations were conducted at legal institutions such as the Security Department and investigator's offices. However, two respondents reported that the initial investigation was carried out by the anti-socialist and anti-capitalist task forces, and then the cases were transferred to the state security agency office. (2024-In-depth-2, 2024-In-depth-5)

[Figure 15] Agencies Conducting Investigations After Arrests (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)



(3) Implementation of Legal Procedures – Compliance with Investigation and Preliminary Examination Period After Arrest

The Public Safety Enforcement Law limits the detention period to within 10 days.

Article 50: The detention period for those who have violated the law is up to three days for local police departments and up to 10 days for municipal, district or county police departments. Vehicles may be detained for up to 10 days by municipal, district or county police departments.

In criminal cases, investigation is seen as the start of handling a criminal case. Similar to South Korean law, there are provisions such as preparing a detention decision within 48 hours of arrest and obtaining approval from a higher authority (Criminal Procedure Law Article 142), or immediately releasing the suspect if criminal suspicion is not confirmed within a 10-day period (Criminal Procedure Law Article 143). Article 174 stipulates that both investigators and preliminary examiners must decide to prosecute or release within 10 days.

Article 174 (Timing of Arrest and Detention Measures). Arrest and detention measures are taken after deciding on criminal prosecution. In special cases, investigators and preliminary examiners can make arrest and detention decisions with prosecutor's approval before deciding on criminal prosecution. In this case, a decision on criminal prosecution must be made within 10 days; if not, the detention measure must be lifted.

Our survey results show that among the 13 arrested individuals, five were investigated

[Figure 16] Time Required for Investigations, by Region



for seven days or less, and six cases lasted up to a month (see Figure 16). Regionally, respondents arrested in North Korea-China border areas and Pyongyang tended to undergo slightly longer investigations compared to those arrested in inland border or central inland regions. There were two cases in the central inland region where investigations lasted more than a month.

In responses from witnesses of 60 arrest cases, regarding how long the investigations of those detained and arrested lasted, six cases were within seven days, 22 cases were within a month, 18 cases were within six months, and two cases were even up to a year (see Figure 17). In the central inland region, the investigation periods of six months to one year totaled eight cases, higher than in other regions. In the responses from officials, the actual investigation periods ranged from a minimum of three days to a maximum of six months, according to the severity of each case.

[Figure 17] Time Required for Investigations, by Region (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)



Out of the 13 people arrested, 11 were interrogated while in detention. There were no significant differences based on gender, age, or region (see Figure 18). When examined alongside the circumstances of the crackdowns, whether someone was detained or not seems to depend mainly on the severity of their actions at the time of the crackdown.

[Figure 18] Detainment After Arrest



Out of the total 60 arrest cases witnessed by others, 33 cases underwent preliminary examinations. Regionally, inland areas showed the highest proportion of preliminary examinations. Pyongyang was the only area where the number of cases without preliminary examination was higher than those that received it (see Figure 19).

[Figure 19] Instances of Preliminary Examinations, by Region (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)



Article 183[25] of the Criminal Procedure Law stipulates a 10-day limit for preliminary examinations of cases where a punishment of labor reeducation is anticipated. According to Article 147 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the preliminary examination must be completed within two months. Article 148 of the Criminal Procedure Law states that for cases involving short-term labor, the preliminary examination can last up to four months, and for particularly complex criminal cases, it can be extended to five months.[26]

[Figure 20] Periods of Preliminary Examinations, by Region (Witnessed Cases)



25 Article 183 (Detention Period) The detention period for preliminary examination of a suspect shall not exceed two months. For criminal cases where labor training punishment is anticipated, the detention period for preliminary examination shall not exceed 10 days. For criminal cases returned by the prosecutor or court, the detention period for preliminary examination shall not exceed 20 days, and for criminal cases where labor training punishment can be given, the detention period shall not exceed seven days.

26 For particularly complex criminal cases where the preliminary examination cannot be completed within the period specified in Article 147, Paragraph 1, of this law, the following extensions are allowed, in accordance with the procedures stipulated in Article 184, Paragraphs 1 and 2: For criminal cases where articles, paragraphs, or clauses of the Criminal Law prescribing fixed-term correctional labor of 10 years or more, life correctional labor, or the death penalty may be applied, the preliminary examination can last up to five months from the date it began. For other criminal cases where articles, paragraphs, or clauses of the Criminal Law prescribing correctional labor may be applied, the preliminary examination can last up to four months from the date it began. In cases where the preliminary examination of criminal cases that may involve short-term labor punishment as prescribed by the Criminal Law cannot be completed within the period specified in Article 147, Paragraph 2, of this law due to unavoidable reasons, it may be extended for five days with the approval of a prosecutor.

According to our investigation results, the preliminary examination period for observed cases was most frequently between one month and six months. Regionally, inland areas showed the highest frequency of cases lasting up to six months, while border regions and central areas had similar proportions of cases lasting from one to six months (see Figure 20). Based on our findings, it was not clearly confirmed whether the four-month time limit was adhered to even during the preliminary examination stage, which is part of the process of determining criminal responsibility. However, considering the long-term investigation process, judicial institutions in the current North Korean legal system enforcing the law against reactionary culture and ideology are clearly violating the aforementioned regulations.

(4) Implementation of Legal Procedures – Availability of Legal Assistance

When asked if they were informed about the legal assistance they could receive during the investigation process after arrest, 12 people responded that they were not informed, and one person did not respond (see Figure 21).

[Figure 21] Were Explanations Provided About Legal Assistance During the Investigation Process?



According to Articles 165[27] and 166[28] of North Korea's Criminal Procedure Law, when

27 Criminal Procedure Law Article 165: The preliminary examiner interrogating the accused shall first confirm their identity and then inform them of their rights.

interrogating a suspect, the preliminary examiner must first verify their identity and then inform them of their rights. The suspect's rights (Article 166) include six items, including the right to receive assistance from a defense lawyer. Additionally, Article 9, Paragraph 1,[29] of the North Korean Lawyers' Law stipulates that lawyers can have conversations or correspondence with suspects and defendants.

While it could be argued that they didn't hear about their rights or legal assistance because it was an investigation process rather than a preliminary examination, subsequent survey results related to preliminary examinations show that most respondents reported not receiving explanations about legal assistance they could receive. Therefore, this suggests that the aforementioned North Korean Criminal Procedure Law and Lawyers' Law are not well observed.

Only one respondent, a man in his 20s from the central inland region, underwent preliminary examination after investigation. The preliminary examination was conducted while in detention, with one person conducting the examination. The respondent said he did not receive any explanation about legal assistance he could receive during the preliminary examination process. Out of the total 13 people with arrest experience, two (15.4%) were sent to labor training camps, one (7.7%) to a

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28 Article 166 of the Criminal Procedure Law: The rights of the accused during preliminary examination are as follows:
1. If the accused cannot admit to the crime specified in the decision to prosecute, they may raise an objection.
2. If the accused cannot admit to the crime being pursued by the preliminary examiner, they may directly refute it or demand a thorough investigation and clarification.
3. The accused may receive assistance from a defense attorney.
4. The accused may request a change of the preliminary examiner or other persons involved in the proceedings.
5. The accused may demand to write their own statement directly in the interrogation record or to modify, delete, or supplement the content of the interrogation report.
6. If the accused believes their rights have been violated, they may raise their concerns to the prosecutor or defense attorney.

29 Article 9 of the Attorney Law. Attorneys have the following rights:
1. They can view criminal case records and communicate or correspond with the accused or defendant.
2. They can communicate with witnesses and expert witnesses.
3. They can collect and verify evidence necessary for defense, and if there are special reasons to preserve evidence, they can request the court to examine the evidence before the trial.
4. They can request relevant agencies, enterprises, organizations, and citizens to allow access to and submit documentary evidence and physical evidence necessary for defense.
5. They can submit necessary opinions to the prosecutor or court to ensure that the rights of the defendant are guaranteed.
6. They can appeal to a higher court against the first instance judgment or ruling of the case they are handling and can participate in the second instance trial that reviews the appeal.

reeducation camp, and six respondents did not answer about their final punishment.

When examined by gender, women appeared to receive harsher punishments than men. This trend was also observed in the crackdown and arrest situations. It can be interpreted that women have more opportunities to access external media while engaging in side jobs like trading, and when caught selling memory devices containing external media, the crime of distribution is considered more severe than simply consuming external media.

[Figure 22] Level of Final Punishment, by Gender (Direct Experience)



Among the 13 people who reported having been arrested, only one person — a woman in her 50s — testified to having received a trial for final punishment. She stated that the trial took place at the "people's court" and that she had no legal assistance from a defense attorney during the trial. A noteworthy point is that she testified that the defense attorney, rather than contributing to legal protection, discouraged appeals by warning that appealing would result in a more severe punishment. This highlights an area where fundamental improvements are needed regarding the role of "defense attorneys" and their function for the benefit of citizens.

When the 38 people who experienced crackdowns were asked if there were any

measures to protect or defend themselves until the final punishment or disposition, 29 (76.3%) responded that there were none, while only one person (2.6%) said there were (see Figure 23). Among those who responded negatively, some added that protection could be received if one had a family member or sibling in a position of power, and that money was necessary to receive protection.

[Figure 23] Were Measures Implemented to Protect or Defend Suspects?



Article 354 of the Criminal Procedure Law stipulates those defendants, defense attorneys, and damage compensation claimants who object to initial judgments and rulings can "appeal" to a higher court. However, the fact that North Koreans who experienced crackdowns had never heard of ways to receive protection until the verdict, and that they were told they could receive a more severe punishment if they did appeal, demonstrates that these regulations are not being followed.

Regarding the final question about what punishments were given to those caught under the law against reactionary thought and culture, there were 34 cases of correctional labor sentences, with 20 cases of short-term labor detention being the most common. There were also 21 cases where individuals either paid bribes to avoid punishment or paid fines (see Table 10). While there were no reports of public executions, there were seven cases where respondents said the individuals did not return, although the level of punishment was unclear. There was also one case of someone being sent

to a political prison camp. Other punishments included forced discharge of soldiers, families being exiled together, and verbal warnings.

[Table 10] Final Punishment, by Geographical Area (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyong yang	%	Central Region	%
Avoided punishment by paying a fine or bribes	2	14.3%	7	20.6%	3	27.3%	9	23.1%
Was arrested but released after a few days	0	0.0%	3	8.8%	1	9.1%	0	0.0%
Labor training camp	2	14.3%	7	20.6%	5	45.4%	6	15.4%
Correctional labor camp	7	50.0%	11	32.4%	0	0.0%	16	41.0%
Political prison camp	0	0.0%	1	2.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
I don't know the level of punishment; didn't return	2	14.3%	2	5.9%	0	0.0%	3	7.7%
Public execution	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Other	1	7.1%	3	8.8%	2	18.2%	4	10.2%
No Response	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.6%
Total	14	100%	34	100%	11	100%	39	100%

Regarding questions about reasons for punishment, the most common response overall was the influx and spread of reactionary ideological culture using computers and storage devices. Article 16 of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law (Prohibition of viewing and distribution through computers and storage media) stipulates that institutions, enterprises, organizations, and citizens must not view or distribute impure publications or propaganda materials to others using computers or storage media.

Looking at regional trends, in the Pyongyang area, viewing and distributing reactionary ideological culture on mobile phones were high at a similar rate. In inland and central regions where Korean radio and television signals can be received, viewing and distributing reactionary ideological culture through television and radio were high at a similar rate. The influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture through the border was found to be higher than in other regions.

Chapter 2 of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law categorizes

and prohibits the following routes of influx: borders (Article 9), publications and propaganda materials (Article 10), spheres related to foreign trade and affairs (Article 11), radio waves and the Internet (Article 12), and enemy objects (Article 13).

[Table 11] Laws Applied During Crackdowns, by Geographical Area (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyongyang	%	Central Region	%
Infiltration and spread of reactionary ideology and culture through borders	2	8.3%	10	20.4%	0	0.0%	6	11.1%
Infiltration and spread of reactionary ideology and culture through trade with the outside world	1	4.2%	3	6.1%	0	0.0%	1	1.9%
Infiltration and spread of reactionary ideology and culture through television and radio	2	8.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	4	7.4%
Infiltration and spread of reactionary ideology and culture using copiers and printers	3	12.5%	1	2.0%	1	6.2%	3	5.5%
Infiltration and spread of reactionary ideology and culture using computers and storage devices	1	4.2%	15	30.6%	6	37.5%	12	22.2%
Viewing and spreading reactionary ideology and culture through television and radio	7	29.2%	4	8.2%	0	0.0%	10	18.5%
Viewing and spreading reactionary ideology and culture through mobile phones	4	16.7%	3	6.1%	5	31.2%	6	11.1%
Viewing pornographic materials and spreading superstitions	0	0.0%	3	6.1%	0	0.0%	1	1.9%
Use of puppet (South Korean) language, writing, and pronunciation	2	8.3%	7	14.3%	3	18.8%	6	11.1%
Failure to report, possession, viewing, and spreading of enemy materials and found items	2	8.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.9%
Lack of home education by parents	0	0.0%	1	2.0%	1	6.3%	1	1.9%
Other	0	0.0%	2	4.1%	0	0.0%	3	5.5%
Total	24	100%	49	99.9%	16	100%	54	100%

There were 32 cases of trials where final punishment was handed down, with the notable characteristic that there were no reported cases of trials in the Pyongyang region compared to other areas (see Table 12). For Pyongyang respondents, there were no cases of correctional labor sentences, only short-term labor sentences, indicating that they did not witness any trials. When sentenced to correctional labor, individuals experience exile to rural areas or a drop in social status, so there would seem to be a strong desire to avoid correctional labor through bribery.

The trial venues were mostly in the form of public trials held in stadiums, outdoor parks, squares, etc., rather than in official courtrooms. This can be seen as an intention to raise awareness among the masses by publicizing the punishments.

Among the testimonies about crackdowns by officials, there was a testimony (2024-In-depth-2) stating that when special crackdowns were conducted at the time the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law was introduced in 2020, everyone was being careful, and no arrests were made. As a result, some people were publicly executed as examples who had been arrested and were awaiting punishment even before the law was enacted, considering various conditions such as family background. This clearly shows the arbitrary application of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law. Additionally, the data suggests that executions are done only in special cases with only a few witnesses, rather than being completely open to the public.

In the in-depth interviews with current officials, 7 out of 8 cases involved relatively serious crimes such as watching South Korean dramas together or selling memory devices. Consequently, the final punishments were severe, ranging from five years in re-education camps to public execution. Notably, with the inclusion of laws targeting minors and strict enforcement against them, there were cases where high school students who watched South Korean movies and listened to music together received heavy sentences such as 13 years and seven years of correctional labor, confirming that severe sentences were given even to minors.

[Table 12] Whether Trials Were Held, by Geographical Area (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyong yang	%	Central Region	%
Received Trial	8	80.0%	9	42.8%	0	0.0%	15	62.5%
Did Not Receive Trial	1	10.0%	6	28.6%	3	75.0%	3	12.5%
Other/Don't Know	0	0.0%	3	14.3%	0	0.0%	2	8.3%
Currently Under Investigation	1	10.0%	2	9.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
No Response	0	0.0%	1	4.8%	1	25.0%	4	16.7%
Total	10	100%	21	100%	4	100%	24	100%

To the question about whether there was assistance from a defense attorney during the trial, 10 respondents responded affirmatively (see Table 13). However, looking at the details provided on the assistance of defense attorneys, there were explanations such as "there was a judge, prosecutor, and lawyer present," suggesting that the responses were given without a clear understanding of the concept of defense attorney assistance.

Examining the descriptions of the trial processes, the role of the defense attorney was generally more about fulfilling the formality of a trial rather than defending the position of the accused, as is common in other countries. One of the respondents (2024-PY-1) even recalled that a lawyer said, "If you appeal, you will receive a harsher punishment." Most descriptions indicated that trials typically begin with the prosecutor explaining the case, followed by the lawyer presenting opinions, and concluding with the judge pronouncing the sentence.

[Table 13] Support From a Lawyer During a Trial, by Geographical Area (Witnessed Cases)

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyong yang	%	Central Region	%
Yes	1	12.5%	4	44.4%	0	-	5	33.3%
No	5	62.5%	2	22.2%	0	-	7	46.7%
Don't Know	0	0.0%	2	22.2%	0	-	0	0.0%
No Response	2	25.0%	1	11.1%	0	-	3	20.0%
Total	8	100%	9	100%	0	-	15	100%

Furthermore, it was revealed that in public trials, the process usually involved reading out the charges and the prosecutor and judge pronouncing the verdict and sentence without any defense from a lawyer.

Evidence that the concept of legal assistance was not well understood can also be seen in the responses to the following question. When asked if there were any measures for self-protection or defense until the final punishment was received, all respondents answered that there were none. This suggests that in the previous question, respondents might have reported receiving legal assistance simply because a defense attorney was present at the trial, even though they were effectively unable to receive any assistance (see Figure 24).[30]

[Figure 24] Whether Protective Measures Were Implemented, by Geographical Area (Witnessed Cases)



In in-depth interviews with current officials, when asked if they knew what legal help the accused could receive during the investigation period, all respondents answered that the accused could not receive any legal help. Despite Articles 165 and 166 of the Criminal Procedure Law specifying the rights of the accused, it is confirmed that these rights are not being realized at all. This shows that either the

30 Article 2 of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law deals with blocking the influx of reactionary ideology and culture and mandates the most severe punishment for the importation and distribution of external information through various media.

law is known but not enforced, or investigations are conducted without awareness of legal procedures. Both the individuals subject to investigation and law enforcement officials seem to lack awareness of the legal rights of the accused in the legal process.

This confirms that individuals are unable to receive protective measures for themselves. When asked about the most significant factors influencing punishment decisions under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, in-depth interview respondents most frequently chose the content of the crime (three people) and the existence of policy directives at the time of crackdown (two people). Additionally, they mentioned the influence of the person deciding the punishment level, and the social background or economic status of the detained individual.

When asked if the punishment for those caught under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law is applied exactly as specified in the law's sentencing guidelines, all respondents answered that it is applied differently. When asked why that is so, they responded that even for the same crime, the sentencing inevitably varies depending on the detained person's family background, economic status, family environment, and social status. They also mentioned that bribes influence sentencing. Based on these responses, it appears that the detained person's circumstances have a greater impact on punishment than the provisions of the law itself.

[Table 14] Most Influential Factor in Deciding Punishment (Witnessed Cases/Multiple Responses Allowed)

	Inter-Korean Border	%	China-DPRK Border	%	Pyong yang	%	Central Region	%
Details of the crime	8	42.1%	26	37.1%	10	50.0%	12	24.5%
Influence of the person deciding level of punishment	2	10.5%	11	15.7%	3	15.0%	10	20.4%
Existence of policy directives at the time of crackdown	5	26.3%	20	28.6%	5	25.0%	14	28.6%
Social status or economic level of the person caught	4	21.1%	8	11.4%	2	10.0%	10	20.4%
Scope of the case	0	0.0%	5	7.2%	0	0.0%	3	6.1%
Total	19	100%	70	100%	20	100%	49	100%

The Commission of Inquiry (COI) report published in 2014 had already recommended 19 measures for North Korea to take, including the stipulation that "the right to a fair trial and due process as elaborated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be ensured."

This perception is similarly reflected among the general population. When 100 ordinary citizens were asked about the most significant factors influencing punishment decisions under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, the content of the crime and the scope of the incident were rated highest at 26%, followed by the existence of policy directives at the time of crackdown at 39%. The responses to this question didn't show significant differences across gender or age groups. However, when viewed by region, the central region uniquely showed an even distribution across all options, unlike other regions.

6 Crisis for North Koreans - Lack of Legal Awareness

Residents were asked about their level of knowledge regarding the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law. In response, 45.7% said they "know about the punishment levels in the law's provisions," and 20.7% said they "know about cases of violation," both relatively high percentages (see Table 15). On the other hand, only about 10% of respondents said they know about "the specific contents of the law's provisions" or "the stages of arrest, investigation, preliminary examination, and trial." This suggests that awareness is low regarding how the law is enforced and what procedures are involved. The proportions of these responses did not show significant differences across gender, region, or age groups.

[Table 15] Whether Respondents Were Aware of Legal Provisions (Multiple Responses Allowed)

	# of Respondents	Percentage
Know the specific details of the law	20	14.3%
Know about the punishment levels for violating the law	64	45.7%
Know about cases of violation	29	20.7%
Know specifically about the stages of arrest, investigation, preliminary examination, and trial	17	12.1%
Other	10	7.2%
Total	140	100%

This result once again confirms that most of the educational content in lectures focuses on examples of actions that violate the law and the punishments one can receive for breaking the law. It reaffirms that education about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law is focused on amplifying fear.

Looking at the content of the responses to the previous survey, we can see that the application of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law is very arbitrary, and the standards for punishment and enforcement are applied differently from the

legal standards. The crisis for North Koreans primarily begins with the arbitrary application of the law. The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law defines everything from clothing styles to consuming media as illegal, making it difficult for residents to judge which actions are legal and which are illegal.

Even if they can determine which actions are punishable, for North Koreans who have been exposed to a politics of fear for a long time, the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law is simply another restriction on their lives. Furthermore, because the law is arbitrarily applied, it inevitably brings greater confusion.

North Koreans' confusion is well illustrated in the following question. In this survey, to understand how aware North Koreans are of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, we asked about investigation and trial process when arrested under this law (see Tables 16 and 17). In response to these questions, respondents chose conflicting answers or professed ignorance, suggesting that North Koreans are unsure about what they know.

[Table 16] Awareness of Investigation Process

	# of Respondents	Percentage
Know in detail about the investigation location and process	35	33.7%
Know the investigation location but not the process	49	47.2%
Don't know the investigation location but know the process	10	9.6%
Don't know for sure	8	7.7%
Other	1	0.9%
No response	1	0.9%
Total	104	100%

[Table 17] Awareness of Trial Process

	# of Respondents	Percentage
I know in detail both the location of trials and the process	28	28.0%
I know the location of trials but not the process	33	33.0%
I don't know the location of trials, but I know the process	12	12.0%
I'm not sure	27	27.0%
Total	100	100%

If the primary factor in the crisis for North Koreans is their lack of understanding of the law and its arbitrary enforcement, what exacerbates this situation is the absence of a system to rescue detained North Koreans and the lack of awareness among residents about such systems. In this survey, we asked North Koreans if they were aware that the right to petition (sinso) is legally guaranteed. The response rate for those who did not know it was legally guaranteed was 35%, and 29% responded that they neither knew it was legally guaranteed nor knew how to petition. Notably, among those in their 20s, there was a high percentage who didn't know that petitioning was legally guaranteed or how to do it, demonstrating the vulnerability of the youth who are the main targets of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law.

[Table 18] Awareness of Petition Process, by Age

	20s	%	30s	%	40s	%	50s	%	60s	%
I know that petitions are legally guaranteed, and I know how to petition	3	13.1%	11	39.3%	13	46.4%	7	38.9%	1	33.3%
I know how to petition but didn't know it was legally guaranteed	5	21.7%	11	39.3%	9	32.1%	9	50.0%	1	33.3%
I don't know if it's legally guaranteed, and I don't know how to petition	15	65.2%	6	21.4%	5	17.9%	2	11.1%	1	33.3%
No response	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	3.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	23	100%	28	100%	28	100%	18	100%	3	99.9%

In addition, the perception of current officials is also one of the factors exacerbating the crisis for North Koreans. As we have seen earlier, officials believe that detained North Koreans cannot receive any legal help, indicating a complete lack of awareness about the rights of North Koreans.

Furthermore, when asked about the criteria for deciding on the death penalty and public executions, which are the strongest punishments specified in the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, four out of five respondents in the in-depth interviews cited the existence of policy directives at the time of crackdown. This also shows that the right to life of North Koreans can be violated by arbitrary decisions, not based on the provisions of the law, but when the North Korean regime deems severe

punishment necessary.

In this way, the arbitrary enforcement of the law, lack of awareness of citizens' rights, and the lack of human rights awareness among law enforcement officials, combined with the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, are pushing North Koreans into an even greater crisis.

7 Conclusions and Implications of this Survey

The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law in North Korea has significantly impacted citizens' daily lives and freedoms since its enactment. This impact is felt through strengthened enforcement agencies, more frequent crackdowns, and an expansion of locations where these crackdowns occur. Residents often lack a clear understanding of the law's provisions, leading to fear and uncertainty.

The state's top-down ideological education emphasizes severe legal punishments, while also imposing collective responsibility on families and youth leagues. This approach reinforces family-unit control structures and severely limits opportunities for individual thought, expression, and cultural exposure. The situation reflects the clearly regressive nature of North Korea's rule of law.

Concerningly, those enforcing the law may not always be official members of legal institutions, raising questions about potential human rights violations in enforcement procedures. Even legitimate law enforcement officials might arbitrarily apply the law or exploit residents through bribery, especially during intense crackdown periods following new directives.

Many North Koreans appear to be insufficiently aware of the law, and particularly its human rights provisions. As a result, they face comprehensive crackdowns and threats of legal punishment without knowing how to protect themselves within the system. This lack of awareness, combined with strict enforcement, creates a pervasive atmosphere of vulnerability and control among the population.

North Korea has long used fear as a tool for controlling its population, and the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law can be seen as a legal embodiment of this strategy. While surveillance in daily life was already widespread, this law formalizes and attempts to justify such intrusive monitoring beyond routine

observation.

However, this legislation clearly violates the freedoms of thought, conscience, and expression guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Our survey reveals that even North Korea's own legal procedures are often disregarded in the enforcement of this law. Arrests are made without proper warrants, families are not notified of detentions, and accused individuals are not informed of their rights. Moreover, investigation time limits are frequently exceeded.

The application of punishments under this law appears largely arbitrary, often influenced by factors such as social status, economic situation, personal connections, the intensity of ongoing crackdowns, and bribery. This inconsistency in enforcement further undermines the law's legitimacy.

While North Korea may use this law to control its citizens domestically and justify its actions internationally, it's crucial for the global community to emphasize that not all state actions are legitimized simply by being codified into law. From an international human rights perspective, the provisions of this law significantly violate basic individual rights and contradict established norms.

The international community must clearly communicate to North Korea that state legitimacy hinges on protecting citizens' human rights, not on enacting oppressive legislation. It should be made clear that the very existence of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law undermines North Korea's standing in the global community and its claims to legitimate governance.

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Survey

Part 1. Personal Information

1. What is your gender? ① Male ② Female

2. What year were you born? ( ) year

3. Which region do you currently live in?

① North Hamgyong Province ② South Hamgyong Province
③ Ryanggang Province ④ Jagang Province
⑤ North Pyongan Province ⑥ South Pyongan Province
⑦ North Hwanghae Province ⑧ South Hwanghae Province
⑨ Kangwon Province ⑩ Pyongyang City
⑪ Nampo Special City ⑫ Kaesong Special City
⑬ Rason Special Economic Zone

4. What is your official job (assigned by the state)?

(1) Occupation ( ) (Examples: ① Trade/Foreign Currency Earning ② Healthcare (doctor, pharmacist, etc.) ③ Education (elementary, middle, high school, university teacher, etc.) ④ Researcher ⑤ Office Worker (administrative agency) ⑥ Party Organization Worker ⑦ Security Officer/Soldier ⑧ Factory/Enterprise Worker ⑨ Agriculture/Fishery Worker ⑩ Dependent (housewife) ⑪ Student ⑫ Cultural/Arts Professional ⑬ Unemployed ⑭ Retiree ⑮ Other ( )

(2) Workplace name ( )

(3) Position ( )

5. If you have a side job outside your official workplace, what is it?

① Trading ② Smuggling (including illegal sales)
③ Healthcare (doctor, pharmacist, etc.) ④ Home-based manufacturing
⑤ Private tutor (elementary, middle, high school, university, cultural/arts, music, retired teacher)
⑥ Researcher side job

⑦ Mining/Factory/Enterprise side job worker (unofficially employed)
⑧ Agriculture/Fishery side job ⑨ Other ( )

6. What is your highest level of education?
① Never attended school ② Elementary school dropout
③ Elementary school graduate ④ Lower middle school dropout
⑤ Lower middle school graduate ⑥ Upper middle school dropout
⑦ Upper middle school graduate ⑧ College, higher technical school dropout
⑨ College, higher technical school graduate ⑩ University dropout
⑪ University graduate ⑫ Postgraduate, research institute dropout
⑬ Postgraduate, research institute graduate ⑭ Other ( )

7. What is your average monthly income?
(1) North Korean won
(2) US dollars
(3) Chinese yuan
(4) Other ( )

Part 2. Information about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law

8. Have you heard about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law ?
① Yes (Go to 8-1)
② No (Go to 9)
8-1. From whom and how did you hear about it? ( )
8-2. What did you hear about it? ( )
8-3. Does the content of the information differ depending on the target audience or policy transmission target? If so, how does it differ? ( )

9. How much do you know about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law? (Multiple answers possible)
① I know the specific content of the law articles.
② I know about the levels of punishment (death penalty, correctional labor, short-term labor, etc.).

③ I know about violation cases.
④ I know specifically about the stages of arrest, investigation, preliminary examination, and trial.
⑤ Other ( )

Chapter 3: Enforcement and Investigation Status of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law

10. We aim to find out whether there have been changes in crackdowns on watching or distributing South Korean and foreign films before and after the enactment of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act.
    10-1. Has the method of crackdowns changed before and after the enactment of the law? ( )
    10-2. Has the content of the crackdowns changed before and after the enactment of the law? ( )

11. Since December 2020, have you ever been subject to a crackdown based on the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, or witnessed or heard about such a process?
    ① I have experienced it, witnessed it, or heard about it (Proceed to 12)
    ② I have only experienced it (Proceed to 12)
    ③ I have not experienced it but have witnessed or heard about it (Proceed to 25)
    ④ No (Proceed to Chapter 4)

12. When was the most recent time you experienced a crackdown? (Example: around March 2024) ( )

13. How many officials from which institution conducted the crackdown?

14. ( ) number of personnel

15. From ( ) institution

16. Where did the crackdown take place? (Region, location name, street, etc.) ( )

17. What was the reason for the crackdown? (Multiple answers possible)
    ① Crackdown on the influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture from the border
    ② Random inspections of devices like TVs, radios, or computers
    ③ Crackdown according to instructions related to the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act
    ④ Crackdown on the use of enemy words, writing, and singing methods
    ⑤ Other ( )

18. Please describe the circumstances during the crackdown (e.g., presentation of ID by the inspectors). ( )

19. Were you arrested after the crackdown?
    ① Yes (Proceed to 18)
    ② No (Proceed to 25)
    ③ I bribed them to avoid arrest (Proceed to 25)

20. If you were arrested, was the reason for your arrest explained? What was the reason?
    ① Yes
    ② No
    (Reason for arrest:)

21. At the time of arrest, did you receive a document showing permission or instruction from the authorities for the arrest or search?
    ① I received permission for the arrest but not for the search
    ② I received permission for the search but not for the arrest
    ③ I received both
    ④ I received neither

22. After being arrested, which institution investigated you?
    ① Local police station ② County/district security department
    ③ City/province security department ④ Regional police office
    ⑤ City/province police office ⑥ Local party office
    ⑦ Special, secret task force (gruppa) ⑧ Other ( )

23. Was your family informed by the authorities about your arrest?
    ① Yes
    ② No
    ③ My family found out through bribery
    ④ Not sure

24. Were you questioned by officials? If so, please explain who conducted the investigation and how it was carried out.
    22-1. How many days were you investigated? ( )
    22-2. How many investigators were involved? ( )
    22-3. Were you questioned while detained? If so, please describe the conditions of the detention center. ( )
    22-4. During the investigation, were you informed of any legal assistance you could receive? If so, what kind of help was provided? ( )

23. After the investigation, did you go through a preliminary hearing? If so, please explain who conducted it and how it proceeded.
    23-1. How many days did the preliminary hearing last? ( )
    23-2. How many people conducted the hearing? ( ))
    23-3. Were you detained during the hearing? If so, please describe the conditions of the detention center. ( )
    23-4. During the hearing, were you informed of any legal assistance you could receive? If so, what kind of help was provided? ( )

24. What was the final punishment or disposition? If you know, please mention the law articles used as the basis for the punishment.( )

25. Did you go to trial for the final punishment?
    ① Yes (Proceed to 25-1)
    ② No (Proceed to 26)
    25-1. If yes, where did the trial take place?
    25-2. Did you receive legal assistance during the trial?
    25-3. Please describe the trial proceedings in detail.

26. Were there any measures taken to protect or defend yourself during the process leading to the final punishment or disposition?( )

27. Have you ever been offered a deal where, if you inform on or monitor others for the authorities, your case would be dismissed, you would receive a lighter sentence, or you would be released?

① Yes

② No

28. Since the enactment of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, how many times have you witnessed or heard about related crackdowns?

① Once

② 2-5 times

③ 6-9 times

④ More than 10 times

29. When was the most recent crackdown you witnessed, experienced, or heard about? (Example: March 2024)( )

30. How many officials from which institution conducted that crackdown?

31. ( ) number of personnel

32. From ( ) institution

33. Who was targeted in that crackdown? (For multiple cases, answer each separately)

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

34. Where was the crackdown conducted? (Region, location name, street, etc.)

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

35. What was the reason for the crackdown? (Multiple answers possible)

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

① Crackdown on the influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture from the border

② Random inspections of devices like TVs, radios, or computers

③ Crackdown according to instructions related to the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act

④ Crackdown on the use of enemy words, writing, and singing methods

⑤ Other ( )

36. Were the individuals targeted in the crackdown arrested? (For multiple cases, answer each separately)

① Yes (Proceed to 34-1)

② No (Proceed to 36)

③ Not sure (Proceed to 36)

34-1. Was the reason for their arrest explained?

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

34-2. Were they shown a document authorizing their arrest or search?

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

34-3. Were their families notified by the authorities about their arrest?

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

34-4. Were they investigated by officials? If so, who conducted the investigation and how did it proceed?

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

34-5. How many days were they investigated?

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

35. After the investigation, did they go through a preliminary hearing? If so, who conducted it and how did it proceed?

35-1. How many days did the preliminary hearing last?( )

35-2. Were they detained during the hearing?

① Yes

② No

36. What punishment (sentence) did the individual receive? Please provide the highest sentence.

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

① No punishment due to bribery or fine (Amount:)

② Arrested but released a few days later

③ Sent to a labor training camp (Sentence:)

④ Sent to a correctional facility (Sentence:)

⑤ Sent to a management facility

⑥ Don't know, but the y did not return

⑦ Public execution

⑧ Other ( )

37. What specific reasons were applied for the punishment? (Select all that apply)

Case 1: ( )

Case 2: ( )

① Influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture through the border (Law Article)

② Influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture in foreign business spaces (Law Article)

③ Influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture through TV, radio (Law Article)

④ Influx and distribution of reactionary ideological culture through printers, copiers (Law Article)

⑤ Watching and distributing reactionary ideological culture through computers or storage devices (Law Article)

⑥ Watching and distributing reactionary ideological culture through TV, radio (Law Article)

⑦ Watching and distributing reactionary ideological culture through cell phones (Law Article)

⑧ Watching pornographic films and distributing superstitious content (Law Article)

⑨ Use of enemy words, writing, and singing methods (Law Article)

⑩ Other ( )

⑪ Lack of parental home education (Law Article)

⑫ Other ( )

38. Did you receive a trial for the final punishment?

① Yes (Proceed to 38-1)

② No (Proceed to 39)

38-1. If yes, where did the trial take place?

38-2. Did you have legal assistance during the trial?

38-3. Please describe the trial proceedings in detail.

39. Were there any measures taken for the person under investigation to protect or defend themselves during the process leading to the final punishment or disposition? ( )

Chapter 4: Legal Process for Determining Punishment

40. Do you know the process of investigation if someone is arrested under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law?

① I know in detail, from the location of the investigation to the process.

② I know the location but not the process.

③ I don't know the location but know the process.

④ I don't know.

⑤ Other ( )

41. Do you know about the trial process?

① I know in detail, from the location of the trial to the process.

② I know the location but not the process.

③ I don't know the location but know the process.

④ I don't know.

⑤ Other ( )

42. What do you think has the greatest influence on determining the punishment for someone arrested under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law?

① What the crime entailed

② The influence of the person determining the punishment

③ Whether there was a policy at the time of the crackdown

④ The social status or economic level of the person arrested

⑤ The scope of the case (e.g., number of people arrested)

⑥ Other ( )

43. Do you know about the process of determining and carrying out the punishment? (Select all that apply)

① I know the criteria for determining the level of punishment.

② I know who (which institution) determines the punishment.

③ I know who (which institution) carries out the punishment.

④ I don't know.

⑤ Other ( )

44. Are you aware that appeals (petitions) are legally guaranteed?

① I know that appeals are legally guaranteed, and I also know how to appeal.

② I know how to appeal but did not know it was legally guaranteed.

③ I don't know if it is legally guaranteed, and I don't know how to appeal.

④ Other ( )

45. Lastly, if you have any opinions or comments about the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, please feel free to share.

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비매품/무료
95340
9 791199 091917
ISBN 979-11-990919-1-7 (PDF)

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